How the Lankan Army Crushed the LTTE

The modern world has rarely seen a force as deadly as the LTTE who fought the Sri Lankan State for almost 30 years. The LTTE's courage and commitment for their cause was legendary and never doubted. But the ground situation in the LTTE strongholds around Killinochi, Jaffna, Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Ampara started changing, perceptions of supremo V Prabhakaran and the legend of the ferocious Tigers started unravelling once President Mahinda Rajapakse's government decided to take the battle head-on in August 2006.

The abortive attempt on Sri Lanka army chief Lieutenant General Sarath Fonsenka by a suspected pregnant LTTE woman cadre inside the military headquarters in April 2006 in a way can be termed as the beginning of the last war fought by the LTTE under Prabhakaran's command. A seriously injured Fonseka escaped death by a whisker and spent the next five months in hospital.

Rajapakse, who was elected as president in November 2005, had fought the election against his rival and former prime minister Ranil Wickremesinghe on the plank of wiping out terrorism from the island nation and the military defeat of the LTTE. Ironically, the Tigers helped Rajapakse's ascent to the most powerful position in Sri Lanka by its diktat to the Tamils, who traditionally supported Wickremesinghe's party, to boycott the election. Despite this generous help from the LTTE, Rajapakse won the election only by a margin of 150,000 votes.

He got the much needed opportunity to launch a military offensive against the Tigers in August 2006 when the LTTE blocked the sluice gates of an irrigation canal in the east over a dispute with the government on execution of a development project in the province.


What began as a fight between the government and the LTTE over the canal issue escalated into a full-fledged war. It was the beginning of the end of the LTTE with the military notching one victory after the other.

The first flashpoint that lead to the LTTE defeat

"This war against the LTTE started in August 2006. The LTTE blocked an irrigation canal in the Eastern provinces which were controlled by the Tigers. The government objected to it. They said this is a cruel thing to do because hundreds of farmers's livelihoods were dependent on it. The LTTE claimed they created an obstacle in the canal project only because the government had not delivered on some other plans and broken promises to release money for development projects for Sri Lankan Tamils.

The tussle over the canal was the first flashpoint that has now ended in the decimation of the LTTE.

The government chalked out a plan to get aggressive. In just a few days, on August 10, 2006, the government closed highway A-9 that connected Jaffna to Colombo. In one stroke that decision affected some 600,000 Sri Lankans who were completely got cut off from the rest of the world.


A-9 is not an ordinary highway. It was a cash-cow for the LTTE. Every item that entered north of Killinochi from the south and mid Sri Lanka was taxed by the LTTE.

The money collected on A-9 was the main source of finance for the LTTE. Their military was strengthened from the tax collected from A-9. The government erected their own entry and exit points on A-9. It was a huge blow to the Tigers.

The LTTE understood the game. On August 14, 2006, two very important events took place. Pakistan High Commissioner retired Colonel Bashir Wali was unsuccessfully attacked.

The same day the government conducted an aerial raid on a school in Mullaitheevu district; 53 girls were killed. The government defended the action, saying the school was training 'suicide bombers'.

In December 2006, a suspected LTTE suicide bomber rammed an autorickshaw into a convoy with Sri Lanka Defence Secretary Gothabaya Rajapakse, the president's brother. He had retired from the Sri Lanka military two decades ago and ran a store in the US. A green card holder, Gothabaya returned to the island at the government's invitation to take over the defence establishment.

The Gothabaya Rajapakse-General Fonseka combination proved lethal for the LTTE. In early 2007 the Rajapakse government took a clear and firm decision that the time had come to hit the LTTE in its heartland.

The east liberated, the LTTE pushed back

The government directed the military to clear the eastern province, parts of which were under the LTTE's control, on the ground that the presence of the Tigers in the coastal towns of Trincomalee and Ampara were a threat to Lankan military assets and posed a serious threat to the unity, integrity and sovereignty of the island nation.


The army first neutralised those areas and safeguarded its military assets. Around July 2007 the operation to liberate the eastern province from the LTTE was completed.

Even as the military operations in the east were on, the Rajapakse government marched a brigade to Mannar to take on the LTTE. The east was declared as 'liberated' in July 2007. Another operation commenced in September 2007 from Vavunnia in the north-east.

It was obvious that because of the frontal attacks, the LTTE went deeper and deeper into the Wanni area, perhaps as part of its so-called 'strategic retreat'.

The confrontation went on and on and on. The LTTE would normally know when the major attack would come, so a week or so earlier they would retreat from the area along with the entire population.

They safeguarded themselves with the 'people.' The Tamils in these areas have always found the Lankan army racist in its approach. They have been indoctrinated by the LTTE that only the Tigers could save them.


As the military offensive began some 300,000 people took a decision to stay with the LTTE and not the military. They took their jewellery, children and belongings to move along with the LTTE. They had faith in the LTTE's invincibility.

In March 2007, the LTTE conducted a stunning operation that may have influenced the Tamil population's decision. Two members of the LTTE's Black Air Tiger suicide squad flew two light aircraft, carried out a daring attack and returned to LTTE territory. The LTTE released photographs of the pilots with Prabhakaran. The world took notice of the LTTE's airpower.

The beginning of the end

The LTTE kept losing territory in the north as a determined military breached LTTE defences in town after town, forcing the Tigers to retreat almost on a daily basis. The LTTE suffered loss after loss. By September 2008, the LTTE had lost some 10,000 square km of land. They were left with less than 5,000 square km.


The army resorted to all out war. They didn't succumb to public concerns, outside opinion and marched on. In the last week of September 2008, the government directed non governmental organisations and United Nations agencies to quit Tiger-held territory on the ground that their safety could not be guaranteed. They set a deadline for people to escape to safer areas.

From all quarters pressure was applied on the Lankan government and military, but they went on. By October-November 2008, the real war started. It was a full scale operation supported by planning, strategy, resources, intelligence and passion.

The first turning point and the beginning of the LTTE's end was there for the world to see when Killinochi fell. On his birthday (November 27), in his Heroes Day speech, even Prabhakaran said, 'The land of Tamil Eelam is confronted with an intense war as never before. Rearing its head in different parts of Wanni, the war is gathering momentum. As the Sinhala State is committed to a military solution, the war is becoming intense and widespread.'

'This war has affected Tamil civilians more than anybody else,' he said. 'By turning the heat of war on our people and by burdening them with immeasurable sufferings, the Sinhala State is aspiring to turn our people against the LTTE.'

It was quite clear that the pressure was on the LTTE. He praised India in that speech. 'I wish to express my love and gratitude at this juncture to the people and leaders of Tamil Nadu and the leaders of India for the voice of support and love they have extended. I would cordially request them to raise their voice firmly.' The message was a petition to India to help him out.

300,000 people moved along with Prabhakaran

Some 300,000 people were moving along with Prabhakaran. He was under strain and he needed respite from war. He thought the people were his insurance and no one would dare to kill 2,000 or more people. He was seeking an end to the war, but the Sri Lankan government had other plans.


December 31 and January 1, 2008, Killinochchi was under the army's control. Weeks before the military marched into Killinochchi town, the LTTE's administrative and political headquarters, the Tigers had moved to other areas. The Sri Lankan army moved into a deserted and desecrated Killinochchi. Barring dogs and cows, the town was left with no human body or soul.

Prabhakaran, the LTTE and Tamils had shifted to Mullaitheevu much before the military arrived in Killinochchi. The military shifted its focus to Elephant Pass which was with the LTTE since 1996. This was very important because it is the entry point to Jaffna.

Prabhakaran tried all ways to drew the world's attention to the plight of 300,000 people. He kept saying it is a genocide against the Tamils.

Back in India no one else but CPI leaders went on a fast in Chennai on October 2, demanding an end to the war on the ground that it was costing too many people's lives. Karunanidhi did his bit by putting pressure on the central government. He forced the government to act before the deadline. He said his ministers would resign if the military offensive against the Sri Lankan Tamils was not reduced. Rajapakse gave a favourable response in words, but the march of his military went on.

The Sri Lankan military's speed was unthinkable for the LTTE.

Mullaitheevu town was captured on January 25.


The actual war accelerated after this date. It was a ferocious war fought by the Sri Lankan army against its own rebels and people. From Mullaitheevu town, Prabhakaran moved people to Puthukkudiyiruppu.

The war here was different from other battles. In Killinochchi and Mullaitheevu, the Tamils retreated or escaped and left behind a ghost town, but in Puthukkudiyiruppu the battle was fought between the LTTE and army and the casualties on both sides were believed to be high.

The Tigers lost most of its fighting force in this battle along with several middle rung leaders. The town was turned into rubble. The LTTE had built some 100 km long earth-walls cum ditches up to 12 feet deep to stop the army's march.

Walls were built to stop the people from moving out and to prevent the army from getting in. Imagine what kind of effort must have gone in before the LTTE was defeated.

The idea was to get the advantage of height and depth, but the LTTE was defeated soon. The LTTE never expected the army would breach the earth walls so quickly.


The Lankan army's final push

The success of the military in breaching the three square kilometre earth wall in Puthumattlam, about 3 km from Puthukkuduriyippu, proved to be a turning point in the war.

From April 20 to 23, over 125,000 civilians fled from the Tigers's clutches and went over to the government side.

The Lankan government described it as the single largest hostage rescue mission ever undertaken in the world. Daya Master, George Master and other senior Tiger officials and other LTTE men surrendered. The people were hungry, tired, defeated, destroyed, and scared.

This was the defining moment when Sri Lankan Tamils emerged from the war zone. The LTTE and thousands of people were shrunk into a 12 square km area. The entrapment was real, but they didn't surrender.


Outside the war zone the government declared 20,000 people were with the LTTE. UN agencies estimated the figure at 50,000, but there were actually 70,000 people with the Tigers.

Meanwhile the election was on in India and the voting for the first phase ended on April 16. On April 27, to help decrease the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam's pressure on the Congress-led government, President Rajpakase issued a cleverly drafted statement that his government's military objective was over and the focus was now entirely confined to rescue people. He said the army would not use heavy weapons.

On May 11, when Sonia Gandhi held a rally along with Karunanidhi, the Sri Lankan military went on a big offensive and shrunk the area under the LTTE's control to 5 square km. Voting in Tamil Nadu concluded on May 13.

From May 14, the military applied maximum pressure on the Tiger cadres and leaders holding onto the last stretch of land they were boxed in. After being encircled, the Tigers had no option but to let the remaining civilians escape from the area.

In less than 24 hours, President Rajapakse, who was at the G-11 summit in Jordan, declared that the LTTE was defeated and that in 48 hours his government would finish its humanitarian operation of the last stretch.

The LTTE understood that the end had come, the game was over. Probably, Prabhakaran and a few of his men were in the last 500 square metre area. On May 15, 16 and 17, the last bunch of 70,000 people came out.

The army captured LTTE sea-war expert Soosai's wife, son and relatives while fleeing the island via the sea. It was the first sign that Prabhakaran had lost control over the organisation, and even his senior comrades were contemplating escape.


At the last minute the president made an offer from Jordan through the Red Cross that the government was ready to accept the surrender of the LTTE top brass. It is not clear what actually happened in the negotiations.

Perhaps the Tiger top brass wanted to surrender to a third party and it was not acceptable to the military. The time had passed for every sane action.

On the morning of May 19, the LTTE's elite commandos and suicide squads fought their last battle. All of them were killed on the battlefield. Prabhakaran's bullet-ridden body was recovered by the Sri Lanka military in the early hours of May 19. Within hours his former trusted commander Colonel Karuna flew down and confirmed his identity.

One bloody chapter of history of this small nation ended that day, May 19, 2009.

Sources: Rediff.com

Why New Delhi fiddles when Lanka burns

This is a very interesting post I read at Rediff written by Shri M.R. Venkatesh. Here is the original post Why New Delhi fiddles when Lanka burns.

When I was in high school, the then Tamil Nadu government used to shut educational institutions for a few days as a mark of protest against the genocide in Sri Lanka. Closing down schools and colleges was supposed to be our 'strategy' of dealing with the Lankan government; our version of 'shock and awe'.

This practice continued even when I was in college. Decades later now my children are in school and as I write this piece, I understand, that the state government is contemplating closure of educational institutions on the Lankan issue. After all, habits die hard.

In the interregnum the state has been witness to several bandhs, strikes and hartals. In fact, at the last count, there has been more bandhs in Tamil Nadu for the Sri Lankan Tamils rather than for the Tamils in TN!

Needless to emphasise, the Sri Lankan Tamil issue has more or less occupied the electoral centrestage since the early eighties when the ethnic crisis erupted in that country. So has it been a part of mainstream Tamil cinema since then. Naturally it has come to occupy the collective psyche of the people of the state.

It may be noted TN is a state where political parties have grounded their appeal on the basis of regional, racial, ethnic, language and of course a separate identity. In fact, certain political parties had taken things so far as to appeal for cessation from India. But that was in the fifties.

It took the sagacious leadership of late Annadurai in the early sixties for the then unified Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam to give up this call. In fact, after the Chinese aggression in the early sixties, the DMK gave up this call and pledged to work for the unity and integrity of India. This remarkable political aboutturn ensured that the DMK (and the breakaway groups) emerged as a potent political force in Tamil Nadu for the next five decades.

Nevertheless, even to this date certain radical groups in TN dream on and are reportedly working for a separate country for Tamils. And for this group a separate Eelam for Tamils in Sri Lanka is the first step in achieving a separate country for Tamils, which would include parts of Tamil Nadu and possibly other countries too!

Therefore, even to this date, for some the Tamil problem in Sri Lanka was meant to be an acid test to these political parties on proving their allegiance to the "cause of Tamils" -- never mind what it actually meant. After all, as someone brilliantly put it, if it is jo bole so nihal in Punjab, it is jo hyperbole so nihal in Tamil Nadu.

The root of the civil war:

The Sri Lankan constitution (unlike the Indian constitution which guarantees equality to all its citizens) positively discriminates against the minority Tamil population of the island country. This is at the heart of the decades-old ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka.

Disagreements between the two dominant communities -- the Sinhalese and Tamils -- can be traced to the then PM Bandaranaike's declaration of the "Sinhala Only Act". This language policy is at the root of the present-day conflict and dates back to the independence of Sri Lanka in 1948. Confrontational policies adopted by both sides since then have actually pushed the country to a precipice.


This diffused situation was ripe for several armed groups to emerge and fight for their rights. One of the groups to emerge was the deadly Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. By the mid-eighties this group had virtually eliminated other major Tamil groups and emerged as the sole representative of the Tamils in Sri Lanka.

This is where the plot goes awry. As a consequence of this development, many representatives of the Tamil groups ended up working with the Sri Lankan government or simply denounced violence and joined mainstream politics. Either way most of them remain opposed to LTTE's vision of an independent state.

Nevertheless, the LTTE was seen as a saviour of the Tamil race at least by some in TN. So did some in the Tamil film industry, which over the years has developed a cosy relationship with the LTTE, just as Bollywood has done with the Mumbai underworld. Crucially, that blurred the distinction between the LTTE and Sri Lankan Tamils.

Using nationalistic sentiment and pandering to Sinhalese demands, successive Sri Lankan governments have been directly and indirectly party to pogroms on Tamils. Caught between a marauding Sri Lankan army on one hand and a merciless LTTE on the other, it was a losing battle for Sri Lankan Tamils right through.

As a tragic consequence of all these, several innocent Tamils were killed there and many more fled the Sinhalese-majority areas, some into neighbouring India. This in short, is the sad, pathetic story of the Sri Lankan Tamils.

W(h)ither Rajiv's vision?

This was in 1987. This continuous flow of refugees from Sri Lanka pitchforked the Indian government into the conflict. It was the visionary leadership of Rajiv Gandhi who saw the emergence of India as a regional power and thereby sought to play a proactive, positive and decisive role in putting an end to this vexatious issue. The airdropping of food and medicine in June 1987 was a case in point -- India flexed its regional muscle.

This in turn led ultimately to the Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord in July 1987 between Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lankan President Jayewardene. Under this accord, the Lankan government made a number of concessions subject to certain conditions to Tamil demands, including devolution of power to the provinces, a merger of Northern and Eastern provinces and official status for the Tamil language.

India in turn agreed to play a guarantor's role by establishing order in the North and East through a peacekeeping force (IPKF). Militant groups including the LTTE, agreed initially to surrender. Later on the LTTE reneged on its commitment as its realized that the IPKF was in effect a deterrent to its plan of an independent Eelam.


While Sri Lanka brilliantly used the IPKF to settle other internal uprisings within, the IPKF would in the next two years became an unwanted force for the LTTE, Sri Lankan government and of course the Sinhalese majority. But it may be rather captivating for the reader to note that the IPKF was equally the villain of the piece in India -- for some political parties in India as well as our human rights groups.

And in the process, the IPKF, in the absence of role clarity as well as political direction suffered heavy causalities. In the withdrawal of IPKF, the vision of Rajiv of India playing the role of a regional power withered. Crucially, when the IPKF withdrew, the Sri Lankan Tamils lost.

Politics makes strange bedfellows indeed

It may be recalled that the DMK (which consistently had a soft corner for the LTTE), which was an integral part of the V P Singh-led National Front government, engineered the withdrawal of the IPKF in 1990. Subsequently, the LTTE assassinated Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 fearing that if he was re-elected he would send the IPKF back to Lanka.

Since then, the Congress party held the DMK guilty of having a hand in the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. In fact, by 1997, the Congress toppled the I K Gujral-led United Front government precisely on the point that the interim report of the Jain Commission that was probing into the conspiracy angle indicted the DMK.

Mysteriously, the final report was silent on the involvement of the DMK in Rajiv's assassination. Why did the commission indict the DMK in its interim report and keep silent in the final report is one of the most intriguing aspects of Indian politics.

But more was to follow. In the next six years, that is by 2003, both the Congress and DMK forgot all this and came together to fight the elections and form the UPA government. Further, in an ironical twist, the DMK depends heavily on Congress for support to sustain its government at the state.

Either way, it is amusing to note that both the Congress and DMK traveling together on the same LTTE boat for over five years. Much as it was political expediency that brought these two parties together, convergence this long on this vexatious issue has raised the eyebrows of many political pundits in Tamil Nadu.

One is indeed flummoxed to note that the DMK that repeatedly used to swear to protect Sri Lankan Tamils has been remarkably silent on the liquidation of the LTTE as well as the attendant genocide in Sri Lanka. Therefore, the empty threat of the DMK to pull out of the UPA government has been the butt of much ridicule in TN.

The Congress knows that most of the other Dravidian parties in the UPA are hot air. Perhaps the Congress, notably the wily old fox of Indian politics Pranab Mukherjee , is fully aware of their addiction to power. Like the LTTE, these parties are least bothered about Tamils in Lanka (or India), except of course the hyperbole.

That explains why local politicians who thundered repeatedly to give their life for the LTTE and Tamil cause have not been able to give up even their government post and the perks associated with it. No wonder, cadres will commit suicide, and leaders will continue to deliver elegy in chaste Tamil.

No wonder Sri Lanka burns, Delhi deliberately fiddles. That is the power of the unspoken words of the final report of the Jain Commission.